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Abstract
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RISK is a popular board game invented by Albert Lamorisse and released in 1957. The
board depicts a stylized political world map divided into territories, each occupied
by one or more of a player’s army units, which we will refer to simply as armies.
The bulk of play consists of a turn-based series of attacks between player armies
occupying adjacent territories in an effort to occupy the entire world. In the late game,
it is common for one player to attempt to eliminate another player along a chain of
territories.
In this note, we consider the problem of how a defensive player should distribute his
armies to maximize the probability of survival. In particular, we will consider a one-
dimensional version of the game, which takes place on a chain of m + 1 consecutive
territories, as depicted in FIGURE 1. We now describe the rules of our version of the
game. Experienced RISK players will note that this is a significantly simplified version
of the game, but we believe that we have captured most of the spirit of the original
game. At the end of the paper, we will discuss some ways in which the differences in
the actual game of RISK might affect our proposed strategies.
a
Attacking
Armies Defending Armies
. . .
d1 d2 dm
Figure 1 One-dimensional RISK board
At the beginning of the game we assume that the attacker has a positive number of
armies (labeled a in FIGURE 1) on a territory at one end and the defender has a number
of armies (labeled d1, . . . , dm) distributed among the other m territories so that there
is at least one army per territory. The goal of the attacker is to take over all m of the
defender’s territories while the goal of the defender is to prevent this from happening.
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The attacker begins by rolling a number of dice that is the lesser of 3 and the number
of attacking armies minus 1. The defender then simultaneously rolls a number of dice
that is the lesser of 2 and the number of defending armies. (We note that in the actual
game of RISK each player may choose to roll a smaller number of dice than allowed.
We assume that they always choose to roll the maximum number allowed.)
The dice rolled by attacker and defender are then sorted and compared. The max-
imum attacking die roll is compared to the maximum defending die roll. If a second
attacker–defender die pair was rolled, the second-to-maximum die rolls are compared
as well. For each attacker–defender die pair, the attacker wins if and only if the attack-
ing die roll is greater than the defending die roll, i.e., the maximum roll wins with ties
going to the defender. For each loss, the attacker or defender removes a single army
from the relevant territory. Thus, the result of a roll of three attacking dice versus two
attacking dice can result (aloss, dloss) ∈ {(0, 2), (1, 1), (2, 0)}, where aloss and dloss are
the number of armies lost for the attacker and defender, respectively.
As long as the attacker has two or more armies remaining and the defender has any
armies remaining, we assume that the attacker will repeat the attack roll process. If
the attacker drops below two armies then we declare the defending army the winner.
If the defending armies are successfully eliminated, the territory is captured, and the
attacker must occupy the territory. We assume that the attacker leaves precisely one
army behind on her territory and moves the remaining armies onto the defender’s ter-
ritory. Assuming she has moved at least two armies, she continues to attack the next
territory in the defender’s chain. The process repeats until the attacking player either
drops below two armies on her leading territory or she captures all of the territories in
the defending player’s chain.
This version of the game captures the essence of the situation in the actual game of
RISK in which players have large numbers of army reinforcements (i.e., from occupa-
tion of entire continents) or are playing RISK variations where one can obtain a large
number of armies by trading in card sets. In those situations, the maximum number of
armies is often moved into a territory after one successful capture. The attacker then
immediately seeks to capture a territory adjacent to the captured territory. This pro-
cess often has the goal to occupy a continent or possibly eliminate an opponent from
the game. It is thus of great interest to understand how the defender army distribution
affects the probability of defender survival.
In the spirit of two earlier articles in THIS MAGAZINE, we implement a Markov
chain model of the game of RISK. In [4], Tan develops such a model in order to answer
the question of when it is worthwhile for a player to attack an adjacent territory and
what the expected damage to the attacker in such a battle will be. Several years later,
Osborne found that Tan’s model made overly strong assumptions of independence, and
in [2], he corrects those assumptions and addresses additional questions of strategy
under his corrected Markov chain model. However, he continues to only look at the
strategy in situations where one territory attacks another, while we look at the more
general question of how to distribute armies among multiple territories in order to
optimize one’s chances of survival. Looking at the numerical results of this model, as
seen below, we have formulated the following conjecture.
Conjecture. In order to best survive an attack on a chain of m territories with d armies
where d ≥ 2m and the number of attacking armies is sufficiently large, the best defense
is to place two armies on each of the first m − 1 territories and the remaining armies
on the last territory.
Pieces of this conjecture have been found in the folklore of the game of RISK, and
in particular it is asserted without justification in [1] that one wants to defend with an
even number of armies whenever possible. We note that this conjecture is not true if
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the number of attacking armies is small: In particular, we will show that a different
strategy is optimal if the attacker only has m + 1 armies, which is the smallest number
that can be used in a campaign against m territories with any hope of success. While
we are unable to prove the full conjecture, we will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In order to best survive an attack on a chain of m territories with n
armies, the best defense will be to place either one or two armies on each of the first
m − 1 territories and the remaining armies on the last territory.
We will also consider a variant on our question in which it is assumed that the
attacker has an overwhelmingly large number of armies and is therefore always rolling
three dice. Under this assumption, we will consider how the defender should place her
armies so as to cause the most damage to the attacker, even though he will eventually
lose all of his armies. While this question is not quite the same situation as we would
like to consider in the game of RISK, it shares many similarities and the fact that the
best strategy is the same as in the conjecture gives us some evidence that the conjecture
is correct. A final section discusses other considerations in the actual gameplay of RISK
that may change the way a player would apply our results in practice.
Our numerical experiments and theoretical computations rely on the following
probabilities, computed by Osborne in [2]. Suppose that for a given battle the defend-
ing player has one army on her territory and the attacking player rolls three dice. It is
an elementary (if tedious) probability calculation to see that the probability that the
value of the defender’s roll is at least as high as the highest of the attacker’s roll is 4411296 ,
and we denote this probability by p˜0. Similarly, the probability that the defender loses
the one army in this battle is 8551296 , which we denote by p˜1. Osborne further computes
the probabilities of all possible outcomes of a given set of die rolls, which we give in
FIGURE 2. In our notation, the letter is dependent on the number of dice rolled by the
attacker, with p meaning three dice, q meaning two dice, and r meaning a single die.
The presence or lack of a tilde depends on whether the defender is rolling one or two
dice, respectively, and the subscript is the number of armies lost by the defender.
Att. Dice Def. Dice Def. Loss Att. Loss Prob. Notation
3 2 2 0 28907776 p2
3 2 1 1 26117776 p1
3 2 0 2 22757776 p0
3 1 1 0 8551296 ~p1
3 1 0 1 4411296 0
2 2 2 0 2951296 q2
2 2 1 1 4201296 q1
2 2 0 2 5811296 q0
2 1 1 0 125216 ~q1
2 1 0 1 91216 0
1 2 1 0 55216 r1
1 2 0 1 161216 r0
1 1 1 0 1536 ~r1
1 1 0 1 2136 0
~p
~q
~r
Figure 2 Probabilities for different outcomes based on the number of dice rolled
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Empirical observations
In this section, we use a Markov chain model of the game of RISK in order to gather
some data that we then use to formulate our conjecture. Recall that our version of RISK
assumes that the attacker armies begin amassed on a single territory adjacent to a chain
of m territories occupied by the defending player. We begin by simulating the battle
between the attacker and the defender in the first territory in the defender’s chain. If the
attacker wins this battle, we assume that she maximally occupies the territory, leaving
behind a single occupying army. She proceeds to attack the defender’s second territory
with the remaining armies, continuing as she wins each additional territory.
We have performed brute-force computations to gain a sense of what distribution
of the defender’s armies will lead to the highest probability that he survives the full
attack. For a given number of total armies, we consider all nontrivial divisions between
the number of attacker armies a and defender armies d. In this context, “nontrivial”
means that the defender has more than one possible distribution to consider, and the
optimal probability for survival is neither 0 nor 1. For each distribution of defending
armies, we computed the probability that the defending player had armies remaining
at the end of the battle.
To get a flavor of these experiments, consider the case where an attacker with 30
armies seeks to eliminate a defender with 30 armies distributed along an adjacent chain
of five defender territories. If we distribute the defending armies uniformly along the
first four chain territories and place the remainder on the last chain territory, we can see
that all even-numbered uniform army distributions yield greater survival probabilities
than each odd-numbered uniform army distribution, as computed from our Markov
chain model and described in FIGURE 3.
Defender Distribution Survival Probability
1 1 1 1 26 0.4986
2 2 2 2 22 0.5367
3 3 3 3 18 0.5165
4 4 4 4 14 0.5271
5 5 5 5 10 0.5216
6 6 6 6 6 0.5242
1
0.49
0.50
0.51
0.52
Su
rv
iv
al
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ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0.53
0.54
2 3
Number of Forward Defenders
4 5 6
Figure 3 Scenarios where defender distributes armies uniformly
Given a number of defending armies, we consider each length m of defender terri-
tory chains that lead to legal, nontrivial distributions. Each territory must be occupied,
so this amounts to the condition 2 ≤ m ≤ d − 1. Given a, d, and m, we then consider
all possible distributions of defender armies, compute the survival probability of each
distribution, and test hypotheses on the optimal distributions. We note that when d is
close to m, then the defender does not have much flexibility in distributing the armies,
and in this situation we will say that the defender is “highly constrained.” Similarly,
when a is close to m, we will say that the attacker is “highly constrained.”
The results of this experiment are contained in FIGURE 4 with axes a, d, and m.
Each glyph represents a class of optimal distribution for a given a, d, and m. In con-
sidering all possible scenarios up to 46 total armies, we observe several patterns that
were the basis for our conjecture and theorems.
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Figure 4 Optimal distributions
• In all cases, the optimal strategy consists of placing either one or two armies on all
but the final territory. We prove that this is the case as Theorem 3.
• When a ≤ m + 2, the defender’s optimal army distribution has a minimal forward
defense of one army per territory with all remaining armies on the last territory. We
call this the one-army strategy and Theorem 2 shows that it is optimal in the case
where a = m + 1.
• When the attacker has a sufficiently large force, the defender’s optimal army distri-
bution has a forward defense of two armies per territory with all remaining armies
on the last territory, as long as the defender has enough armies to use this distribu-
tion (i.e., d ≥ 2m). We refer to this as the two-army strategy and while we have not
been able to find sharp bounds for what we mean by “sufficiently large,” the number
appears to be bounded below by the total number of territories plus a linear function
of the number of attacker armies.
To see situations in the “in-between” cases where the defender uses a mix of the
one- and two-army defense, we let e = a − m be the number of attacker armies in
excess of the number of defender territories. For each 4 ≤ e ≤ 10, FIGURE 5 shows
the smallest number of total armies for which an optimal distribution calls for fewer
than two armies per forward space when it is possible to defend with two armies per
forward space. In each case, note that the number of attacking armies is slightly less
than half the total number of armies.
We observe that one-army distributions occur only in situations in which the
defender is highly constrained. Usually, either the attacker must have just enough
armies to occupy all territories given perfect attacking rolls, or the defender has one
or two armies to distribute beyond the minimum one-army per space for occupation.
Exceptions occur when the number of attacking armies and defending armies are
nearly equal and both players are highly constrained. All cases of optimal one-army
distributions are highly constrained for at least one of the players.
We next observe that in most other cases where the defender can defend with two
armies per forward territory, it is optimal to do so. Most mixed distribution cases are
out of necessity; the defender hasn’t enough armies to defend with two per territory.
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Defender Attacker Defender e = Optimal
Territories (m) Armies (a) Armies (d ) a − m Distribution
4 8 9 4 2, 1, 2, 4
5 10 11 5 2, 1, 2, 2, 4
6 12 13 6 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 4
8 15 17 7 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 4
9 17 19 8 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4
10 19 21 9 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4
11 21 23 10 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4
Figure 5 “Mixed strategy” distributions that are optimal
We also note that the division between mixed and two-army distributions lies almost
exactly along the plane defined by d = 2m, with exceptions occurring only in cases
where the attacker is highly constrained. Most importantly, we note that if neither
player is highly constrained, and the defender can defend with a two-army distribution,
it is usually optimal to do so.
These observations led us to make the conjecture in the introduction, and related
results are discussed in the final sections of this article. FIGURES 6, 7, and 8 depict
several cross sections of the three-dimensional array in FIGURE 4 that we found helpful
in understanding the situations in which various strategies were optimal.
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Figure 6 Cross section where a = 20
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1 or 2 armies per forward territory
2 armies per forward territory
Figure 7 Cross section where a = d
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Figure 8 Cross section where a + d = 42
Holding off a limited number of attacking armies
In this section, we consider strategies based on a fixed number a of attacking armies
and a chain of length m compared to a.
Defending a − 1 territories We begin by considering the case where m = a − 1
and therefore the attacker is highly constrained. In particular, in this case, we are able
to prove the following theorem giving an explicit optimal strategy.
Theorem 2. In order to best survive an attack on a chain of m territories where the
number of attacking armies is m + 1, the best defense is to place one army on each of
the first m − 1 territories and the remaining armies on the last territory.
We note that if the attacker is successful, then she will need all m + 1 of her armies
in order to occupy the m + 1 total spaces involved. In particular, the defending player
will be successful in defending his chain if and only if he manages to defeat a single
attacking army during the campaign.
If m ≥ 3, then in the battle over the first territory, the attacking army will have at
least four armies and therefore will be able to roll the full three dice. In particular, the
probability that the attacker will defeat k armies without losing a single one of her own
armies is given by p
k
2 
2 p˜1
k where k = 0 if k is even and k = 1 if k is odd. This same
formula will hold in each of the first m − 2 territories. For the battle over the (m − 1)st
territory, the formula is similar, only now the attacker is only allowed to roll two dice,
so it becomes q
k
2 
2 q˜1
k
. For the final territory, the attacker is only allowed to roll one
die, and therefore the probability she is successful in a battle against k armies is rk−11 r˜1.
Putting this all together, we see that if the defending player distributes his d armies
so that there are di armies on the i th territory for i = 1, . . . , m − 1 and the remaining
dm = d −
∑
di armies on the final territory, then the probability that the defender will
lose all of his territories is given by the following expression:
F(d1, d2, . . . , dm−1) = p
d1
2 
2 p˜1
d1 · · · p
dm−2
2 
2 p˜1
dm−2q
dm−1
2 
2 q˜1
dm−1r
d−∑ di −1
1 r˜1.
In particular, we note that increasing d1 by 1 leads to the following identity:
F(d1 + 1, d2, . . . , dm−1) =
⎧⎨
⎩
p2
p˜1r1
F(d1, d2, . . . , dm−1) ≈ 2.21F(d1, d2, . . . , dm−1) if d1 odd
p˜1
r1
F(d1, d2, . . . , dm−1) ≈ 2.59F(d1, d2, . . . , dn−1) if d1 even.
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Increasing d1 by one will always lead to decreasing the defender’s probability of suc-
cess, and therefore the defender should choose d1 to be as small as possible. Specifi-
cally, he should place a single army on the first territory. The exact same computation
holds for territories 2 through m − 2. To consider the (m − 1)st territory, we see from
our formula that
F(d1, d2, . . . , dm−1 + 1) =
⎧⎨
⎩
q2
q˜1r1
F(d1, d2, . . . , dm−1) ≈ 1.54F(d1, d2, . . . , dm−1) if m is odd
q˜1
r1
F(d1, d2, . . . , dm−1) ≈ 2.27F(d1, d2, . . . , dm−1) if m is even,
and again we see that the defender should choose dm−1 to be as small as possible.
Defending a − 2 territories In situations in which the attacker has more armies and
can withstand losses, the formula to compute the probability that the attacker wins
is not quite as simple as in the previous theorem and in particular breaks down into
different cases depending on how many armies the attacker loses and when she loses
these armies. In particular, when attacking a territory that defended by k armies, then
one can see that there are 	 k2
 ways in which the attacker can lose one army. Therefore,
if the defending army spreads its d armies with d1 armies on the first territory, d2 on the
second, etc., then there are a total of 	 d12 
 + · · · + 	 dm2 
 ways in which the campaign
can play out with the attacker losing a single army and defeating all m territories. We
note that this sum depends only on the parities of the di . In particular, if d1 ≥ 3, then
we note that there are the same number of cases to consider if we instead distribute the
armies with d1 − 2 armies on the first territory, dm + 2 armies on the final territory, and
di armies on the i th territory for all other i . Moreover, these cases pair up in a natural
way depending on when the attacker loses the single army—in one case, she loses it
on the first roll of the dice, in another the second roll, etc. Depending on when this loss
occurs with respect to the breaks between territories, the probability of a given case
occurring might be different, as we see in the following example.
Example 1. We consider two scenarios in which the defending army has eight armies
to defend four territories against six attacking armies. In Scenario A, the defender splits
the armies 3/2/2/1 and in Scenario B he splits the armies 1/2/2/3. In each scenario,
there are five battles in which the attacker might lose a single army and therefore the
defender wins overall. The following table gives the probability of each of these cases
for each scenario, as well as the case where the attacker does not lose any armies, along
with the relative attacker advantage given by Scenario A.
Battle lost Scenario A Scenario B Attacker Advantage for A
None p2 p˜1 p2 p2q˜1 p˜1 p2 p2q2q˜1 p2q2
First p1 p2 p2q2r˜1 p˜0 p˜1 p2q2r 21 r˜1
p1 p2
p˜0 p˜1r21
Second p2 p˜0 p˜1 p2q2r˜1 p˜1 p1 p˜1q2r 2r˜1
p22 p˜0
p1 p˜1r21
Third p2 p˜1 p1 p˜1q2r˜1 p˜1 p2 p1q˜1r 21 r˜1
p˜1q2
q˜1r21
Fourth p2 p˜1 p2 p1q˜1r1 p˜1 p2 p2q1r1r˜1 p1q˜1q1r˜1
Fifth p2 p˜1 p2 p2q˜0r˜1 p˜1 p2 p2q2q˜0r˜1 p2q2
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In all six cases, one can compute that the attacker’s advantage is greater than one in
Scenario A. In particular, because the probability of the attacker winning the campaign
is the sum of these six cases, each of which prefers the attacker in Scenario A, it is clear
that the defending player should prefer Scenario B and therefore divide the armies as
1/2/2/3.
More generally, one can consider what the various possibilities are for the change in
the attacker’s probability of winning when two armies are shifted from the last territory
to the first territory if one fixes the battle in which the attacker suffers her only casualty.
In the following table, we consider all of the possibilities of where this loss can occur
as well as the parity of the number of defending armies in this territory as well as
the previous territory and the impact that will be felt if the defender moves these two
armies.
Territory Battle of Loss Parity of Defenders Parity of Defenders Advantage for Numerical
of Loss Within Terr. in Terr. of Loss in Prior Terr. Attacker Advantage
No loss p2q2 1.63
Final Not First Any Any p2q2 1.63
Final First Any Even p1 q˜1q1r1 2.35
Final First Any Odd p2 p˜0 q˜1
p˜1q1r1
1.34
Penultimate Last Any Any p1q2
p˜0 p˜1r21
5.33
Penultimate Middle Any Any q2
r21
3.5
Penultimate First Even Even p˜1q2
q˜1r21
3.93
Penultimate First Even Odd p2 p˜0q2
p1 q˜1r21
2.28
Penultimate First Odd Even p˜1 q˜1
r21
5.78
Penultimate First Odd Odd p2 p˜0 q˜1
p1r21
3.35
Other Last Any Any p1 p2
p˜0 p˜1r21
8.69
Other Middle Any Any p2
r21
5.72
Other First Even Even p2
r21
5.72
Other First Odd Even p˜1
2
r21
6.49
Other First Even Odd p
2
2 p˜0
p1 p˜1r21
3.31
Other First Odd Odd p2 p˜0 p˜1
p1r21
3.76
We can see that, in all cases, the attacker is better off if the defender shifts armies to
the front of the line, and in some cases she will be significantly better off, suggesting
that the defender should choose to move pairs of armies to the final territory in the
chain whenever possible.
Defending fewer territories In situations where the attacker has more than
m + 2 armies and therefore can lose more than a single army during the campaign,
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an enumeration of cases becomes significantly more complicated. However, it is clear
that those cases will be a combination of the possibilities enumerated above for situ-
ations where the attacker only loses one army at any given time and situations where
the attacker loses a pair of armies at the same time, which will affect the probabilities
by giving advantages to the attacker of
p2
q2
,
p2
r 21
, or
q2
r 21
, all of which are bigger than
one. Therefore, we conclude that the defender should always move armies in pairs to
the final territory if possible. More specifically, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 3. In order to best survive an attack on a chain of m territories with n
armies, the best defense will be to place either one or two armies on each of the first
m − 1 territories and the remaining armies on the last territory.
We have seen that in the case where the attacker has only m + 1 armies that it will
be best for the defender to place a single army on each of the first m − 1 territories.
In the following sections, we will see that the opposite conclusion holds if the attacker
has an overwhelmingly large number of armies.
Holding off a large number of attacking armies
This section considers the situation in which the attacker has an overwhelmingly large
number of attacking armies. In particular, we assume that the defender has a negligible
chance of defeating the attacker and instead ask what distribution of the defending
armies will do the most damage to the attacker during the campaign. This question is
clearly different from our initial question, but we will see that the answer should be
similar to the optimal distribution in that case.
Defending a single territory The first case we wish to consider is when the defend-
ing player is trying to defend a single territory with d armies on it. Let E(d) be the
expected change that a player with a large number of armies will have when attacking
a territory with d armies. We note that E(d) will be negative.
Lemma 4. E(0) = −1.
In particular, to take over an empty territory, the attacker needs to move a single
army onto that territory, depleting her ranks by one.
Lemma 5. E(1) = −1
p˜1
.
Proof. If the defending player has a single army, then on the first round there will be
two possibilities: With probability p˜1, the attacker will win and therefore only “lose”
the army she needs to use to take over the territory, and with probability p0 the attacker
will lose an army and have to face the defender in the same situation once again. Thus,
E(1) = − p˜1 + p˜0(−1 + E(1)). The lemma follows from a simple calculation, noting
that p˜1 + p˜0 = 1.
When facing more than one army, there are three possible outcomes of a given
attack. Considering these three cases, one can see that for d ≥ 2 we have
E(d) = p2 E(d − 2) + p1(E(d − 1) − 1) + p0(E(d) − 2),
which simplifies to give the following recursive formula for E(d):
E(d) = p2
1 − p0 E(d − 2) +
p1
1 − p0 E(d − 1) −
p1 + 2p0
1 − p0 .
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There are several ways to approach nonhomogeneous recurrence relations such as
this one; we proceed by noting that one can also see that
E(d + 1) = p2
1 − p0 E(d − 1) +
p1
1 − p0 E(d) −
p1 + 2p0
1 − p0 .
Subtracting these two formulae from each other and solving for E(d + 1), one obtains
the following homogeneous recursion formula for E(d + 1):
E(d + 1) =
(
1 + p1
1 − p0
)
E(d) +
(
p2 − p1
1 − p0
)
E(d − 1) − p2
1 − p0 E(d − 2).
The characteristic equation of this recurrence relation is x3 −
(
1 + p11−p0
)
x2 −(
p2−p1
1−p0
)
x + p21−p0 , which factors as (x − 1)2(x +
p2
1−p0 ). It follows from standard re-
sults in recurrence relations (see, for example, [3, Ch. 6]) that the generic solution to
the recurrence relation takes the form
E(d) = c1 + c2d + c3
( −p2
1 − p0
)d
.
Using Osborne’s values for the pi , it is easy to compute values for E(2). Using
the values of E(0), E(1), and E(2), one can solve for the ci and obtain the following
result.
Theorem 6. In a given battle in which the defending player has d armies and the
attacking player starts with a large enough number of armies that she rolls three dice
throughout the battle, the expected number of armies the attacker will lose before
taking over the territory is E(d) = c1 + c2d + c3αd where we define the constants
c1 = − 578702951743204855 , c2 = − 23872797 , c3 = − 164501904743204855 , and α = − 28905501 .
We note that our formula differs somewhat from the formula obtained in [1], in
which they state the results as E(n) = c1 + c2n + c3αn with c1 = 0.22134, c2 =
−0.85341, c3 = −0.22134 (and the same value of α). The difference arises because
we are including the army that the attacker must “leave behind” when she moves onto
the new territory.
Defending a chain of two territories We next consider the case where the defending
player has two territories that he wishes to defend. Moreover, he can split the d armies
between these two territories, although according to the rules of RISK he cannot vacate
either territory. In particular, he must choose k with 1 ≤ k ≤ d − 1 and place k armies
on the first territory and d − k armies on the second territory. If he wishes to do this
to maximize damage to his opponent, then he is trying to choose k to minimize the
function F(k) = E(k) + E(d − k), where E is the function defined in the previous
section. In particular, one can use Theorem 6 to compute that F(k) = 2c1 + c2d +
c3(α
k + αd−k) where α and the ci are the constants given in the statement of Theorem
6. In particular, we note that the first two terms in this formula are constants with
respect to k and moreover that c3 is negative, so it will suffice for the defending player
to maximize the function Fˆ(k) = αk + αd−k .
We note that the function F is symmetric in the sense that the attacker’s expected
losses will be the same if the defender places k armies on the first territory and n − k
armies on the second territory or the other way around. This is slightly different from
actual gameplay in RISK, as our computations show that it is actually advantageous
to place the smaller number of armies on the first territory and the larger number on
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the second territory. To understand why this is so, consider that, in our Markov chain
model, the attacker that captures the first territory must leave behind a single army
when occupying the captured territory. Thus, the attacker is effectively weakened for
the second territory attack, no matter how well the first territory attack proceeds. If
defender armies are unevenly distributed between the two spaces, the defender would
be more likely to survive if the bulk of the defender armies were met by a weakened
attacker. Although in cases with large numbers of armies, this weakening of armies
left behind can be subtle, it is nonetheless a measurable advantage. At the end of
this article, we will discuss further reasons why our model does not capture actual
gameplay with complete accuracy.
Lemma 7. If β > 0 and m > 0, then the function Gˆ(x) = βx + βm−x is minimized at
x = m2 and maximized at both x = 0 or x = m.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is a straightforward calculus exercise, as one notes
that Gˆ ′(x) = ln(β)(βx − βm−x). If 0 < β < 1, then ln(β) < 0 and βx − βm−x will be
positive exactly when x < m − x . If β > 1, then both of these signs will be reversed.
In either case, Gˆ will be decreasing for values of x < m2 and increasing for values of x
that are greater than m2 .
Our function is more interesting, as the value of α that we are working with is neg-
ative and therefore the function Fˆ is only defined at integer values of k. To maximize
this function, we wish to consider two cases based on the parity of d.
We first consider the case where d is even. Note that for all even values of k the func-
tion Fˆ(k) = αk + αd−k = (α2)k/2 + (α2)d/2−k/2. Therefore, if k is an even integer, then
the function Fˆ(k) agrees with the function Gˆ(k/2) as defined in the previous lemma
where β = α2 and m = d/2. This function is maximized by choosing the smallest or
largest values of k possible, which in this case must be k = 2 or k = d − 2 given the
restrictions on k.
On the other hand, if k is odd, then we note that Fˆ(k) = α(αk−1 + αd−k−1) =
α((α2)(k−1)/2 + (α2)(d−k−1)/2). Because α is negative, we note that this number will
always be negative. In particular, it will always be less than Fˆ(k) for any even choice
of k. In particular, we can conclude that if d is even, then Fˆ(k) is maximized when
k = 2 (or k = d − 2 due to symmetry).
If d is odd, then we begin by noting that for even values of k that the function Fˆ(k)
is equal to (α2)k/2 + α · (α2)(d−k−1)/2. Because 0 < α2 < 1, one can compute that this
is a continuous function whose derivative is always negative, and therefore the func-
tion is strictly decreasing. One can similarly show that Fˆ(k) is strictly increasing for
odd values of k. The fact that Fˆ(1) < 0 and Fˆ(2) > 0 then implies that, for integers
between 1 and d − 1, this function is maximized at k = 2 (or k = d − 2 due to sym-
metry).
We have therefore proved the following theorem.
Theorem 8. In a situation in which the defending player is trying to defend two con-
secutive territories with d armies and the attacking army has significantly more than d
armies, then the defending player will cause the most damage if he places two armies
on one territory and d − 2 armies on the other territory.
It is interesting to note that while the best strategy is to place two armies on one
territory and d − 2 on the other, the worst strategy is actually to divide your armies
with one army on one territory and d − 1 armies on the other territory and that in
general one wishes to place an even number of armies on each territory.
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Defending longer chains In this section, we wish to show that the optimal defense
for defending a chain of m territories, assuming that one has d ≥ 2m armies, will be
to place two armies on all but one of the territories and d − 2(m − 1) on the remaining
territory. Having shown this in the case where m = 2, we now wish to proceed by
induction.
Given an arrangement (d1, . . . , dm) of armies on the m territories, we define the
expected loss of armies by the attacker by the function
Fm(d1, . . . , dm) = E(d1) + · · · + E(dm)
= mc1 + dc2 + c3(αd1 + · · · + αdm )
where α, c1, c2, c3 are as defined in Theorem 6. In particular, this function will be
minimized exactly when the function Fˆm(d1, . . . , dm) = αd1 + · · · + αdm is maximized
and the defender’s goal is to choose the constants d1, . . . , dm with 1 ≤ di ≤ d and∑
di = d so that Fˆm(d1, . . . , dm) is maximized.
We note that for any fixed choice of dm , we have that Fˆm(d1, . . . , dm) = αdm +
Fˆm−1(d1, . . . , dm−1). Therefore, this function will be maximized when Fˆm−1(d1, . . . ,
dm−1) is maximized. However, this describes the situation in which a defender is trying
to defend m − 1 territories with d − dm armies, and by the inductive hypothesis we
know that this will be maximized when all but one of the entries is equal to 2.
Another way of seeing this is by contradiction. Assume that Fˆm(a1, . . . , am) is a
maximum value of Fˆm over all m-tuples with
∑
ai = n and further assume that more
than one of the ai is not equal to 2: Without loss of generality, let us assume that
a1 = 2 and a2 = 2. Then Fˆm−1(a1, . . . , am−1) will be a maximum for Fˆm−1 given the
restriction that
∑
ai = n − am . However, this contradicts the inductive hypothesis,
which states that Fˆm−1 will be maximized when all but one of the entries is equal to
two.
We note that the proof of the above theorem is actually quite general and in fact
is quite robust in the values of the pi . In particular, we note that one can conclude
that the same strategy is the best if the attacking player always rolls exactly two dice.
Given that the actual play in the game of RISK is a linear combination of these two
scenarios, it seems natural that the best possible strategy to cause the most damage
to your opponent in the actual game will be to place two armies on each but the final
territory due to a convexity type of argument.
Concluding thoughts
Our model suggests, and proves under various hypotheses, that the best strategy a
defending player has in order to fend off an attacker is to place two armies on each
territory except the last territory, where he will place the remaining armies. However,
there are several aspects of the game of RISK that our model does not accommodate
for, and we conclude this paper by briefly discussing some of these considerations.
In practice, one will usually reverse the distribution of defending armies, putting the
main force at the front. The reason for this is that while this leads to a slight decrease in
survival probability, it gives the defending player an increased expectation of retained
territories leading to an increased expectation in earned army reinforcements. In the
game of RISK, a player receives army reinforcements at the beginning of each turn
according to the total number of territories the player occupies modulo 3 (with a three
army reinforcement minimum) plus bonuses for complete continents occupied.
Thus, while survival is important, a small tradeoff of the probability of immedi-
ate survival is advisable to increase the expectation of territory occupation and thus
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army reinforcements and thus the probability of longer-term survival. Such long-term
strategic considerations are beyond the scope of this tactical paper and would indeed
be interesting future work. However, our work has given substantial evidence that the
two-army-per-territory defense is the most efficient in certain situations and provided
further insight to extreme cases.
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